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Abstract. The special composition question is the question ‘When 
do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question 
in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, 
either by allowing that any two things (no matter how apparently 
unrelated) compose something, or by denying the existence of 
most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new “series-style” 
answer to the special composition question that accords much 
more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from 
van Inwagen’s objections. Specifically, I will argue (among other 
things) that the proposed answer entails the transitivity of 
parthood, that it is non-circular, and that it casts some light on the 
ancient puzzle about the Ship of Theseus. 
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1. Introduction
When do some things compose something? This is van Inwagen’s (1990) special 
composition question (SCQ).  The most popular answer to this question 
(universalism) is that composition always occurs: for any (disjoint) objects, there 
is an object composed of those objects.1 Thus, according to this view, there is an 
object composed of my left pinky and the moon. Meanwhile, the second most 
popular answer—that composition never occurs—denies the existence of such 
1  See, for example, Cartwright (1975), Quine (1981: 10), Thomson (1983: 216–17), Lewis 
(1986a: 212–13, 1991: §1.3), van Cleve (1986, 2008), Heller (1990: §2.9), Sider (2001: §4.9), 
Rea (1998), Hudson (2000, 2001: §3.8), Varzi (2005), Bigelow and Pargetter (2006), and 
Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2006). 
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objects as chairs, tables, rocks, trees, human beings, and so on.2 The so-called 
“moderate” positions of van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001) allow that 
composition occurs in the case of human persons, but they deny tables and chairs. 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997) allow organisms and what they call 
mereological compounds: strange composite objects which look just like ordinary 
objects, but which are incapable of changing parts. They admit that there is 
something where I thought my chair was. But they too deny tables and chairs and 
rocks and mountains, since those things could gain and lose parts if they existed.3 
I will use ‘common sense about composition’ for the view that the most 
obvious objects in our immediate environments (e.g., tables, chairs, organisms, 
and the like) exist, while the extraordinary universalist objects (e.g., pinky-
moons) do not.4 In this sense, the proposals mentioned above do not accord with 
common sense about composition.5 Although this is a natural way to use the 
expression ‘common sense about composition’, nothing substantive depends on 
this choice of terminology. I will not claim, for example, that accord with 
common sense about composition is a virtue (although I believe that it is a virtue, 
I will not rely on this claim). This terminology simply allows me to state my 
project in a handy way: I will provide a new answer to the SCQ which, unlike any 
of the proposed answers so far, accords with common sense about composition.6 
There are two motivations for developing such an answer to the SCQ. 
First, one of the major reasons that so few philosophers accept a commonsense 
                                                          
2  This view is usually called nihilism. Proponents include Hestevold (1981), Hossack (2000), 
Dorr (2005), Horgan and Potrč (2008: chapter 7), and Rea (2001). 
3  Rosencrantz and Hoffman do not endorse an answer to the SCQ, instead contenting 
themselves with an ontology of material objects comprising organisms and “mereological 
compounds”, together with an analysis, in mereological terms, of the kinds of unity that are 
appropriate to each kind of object in the ontology (though see note 19 for an argument that 
their theory is commited to some unintended results). For their discussion of the SCQ, see 
(ibid.: chapter 5, §7). 
4  Note well that I am speaking English, I am not restricting my attention to a limited domain, I 
am not speaking loosely or non-literally, and I’m in the philosophy room (though I believe the 
last point makes no difference). 
5  The (stronger) claim that these views are contrary to what almost all ordinary people believe 
is surprisingly controversial. For example, universalists often claim that ordinary English 
speakers typically use restricted quantifiers, and that, as a result, ordinary people simply 
ignore (rather than deny) the unusual objects recognized by the theory. Similarly, nihilists 
often try to reconcile their view with that of ordinary people by providing elaborate 
paraphrase strategies. Although nothing I say hinges on the rejection of these attempts at 
reconciliation, see Korman (2008, 2009) for a powerful critique. 
6  Markosian’s (1998) view may accord with common sense. On this view, when there is a 
composite object, this cannot be given any informative explanation in terms of a relationship 
between the relevant composers. However, this is not an answer to the SCQ; rather, it’s a 
theory according to which there are no such (non-trivial) answers. Markosian’s more recent 
(2014) regionalist answer to the SCQ (the xs compose something just in case there is 
something exactly where the xs are) is also consistent with common sense. However, 
regionalism is, in addition, consistent with both nihilism and universalism, and thus has little 
to tell us about which objects there are. Regionalism also faces apparent counterexamples: see 





view of composition is that they simply do not see how to work one out.7 My 
proposal will show how we might do what these philosophers have thought to be 
impossible. And, if I am right that the major obstacle to a commonsense view of 
composition is that no plausible proposal has been forthcoming, the mere 
articulation of a commonsense answer is dialectically significant, forcing 
proponents of previously more popular views to rely more heavily on 
controversial arguments.8 
Second, the answer that emerges from trying to accommodate common 
sense about composition is interesting and illuminating, both intrinsically and in 
the light that the answer casts on traditional puzzles involving composition (such 
as the Ship of Theseus, as we will see). The proof of the pudding is in the eating, 
and I will be able to provide only a taste here. But I hope that the taste will leave 
the reader wanting more. 
For these reasons, I will attempt to articulate a commonsense answer to 
the SCQ. But it turns out that accommodating common sense is a tall order. For, 
according to the most natural idea of what such an answer might look like, things 
compose something just in case they’re bonded together in some appropriate way. 
This seems to be the right idea when we think of objects that are welded together 
(say, a barbeque), or objects that are held together with glue (such as a child’s art 
project). But, as van Inwagen points out (1990: §7), it seems that any simple 
bonding answer to the SCQ is doomed to falter on examples such as two people 
glued together at the hand: any such answer will be subject to counterexamples 
involving bonded organisms, which intuitively (and according to common sense) 
do not compose something just by being bonded (in any sense of ‘bonded’). 
To fix this problem, what we need is an answer that allows different 
relations to underlie composition in different cases, so that gluing might make an 
object when we glue the parts of a model airplane together, but not when we glue 
the cat to the dog. What is needed, in short, is what van Inwagen calls a series-
style answer to the question, which is an answer of the form: 
 
For some y, the xs compose y iff the xs are F1 and stand in R1, or the xs 
are F2 and stand in R2, or … 
 
Unfortunately, van Inwagen (1990: 61–71) provides several powerful objections 
to these sorts of answers. 
In what follows, I will defend a commonsense, series-style answer to the 
SCQ that is not subject to any of the difficulties that van Inwagen raises. I will not 
provide a complete justification of the proposed answer. To do this would require, 
among other things, a solution for each of the puzzles and arguments about 
material objects which pose a special difficulty for commonsense approaches: the 
problem of the many, overdetermination problems, debunking arguments, 
                                                          
7  See, for example, Sanford (1993: 223), Horgan (1993: 694–5), Rosenberg (1997: 704), 
Thomasson (2007: §7.3), and, as we will see, van Inwagen (1990). 
8  In this regard, my project will go beyond Silva (2012), who argues that an answer of the sort I 
propose can be given, but who does not provide such an answer. Silva’s general approach 
differs substantially from my own. 
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arbitrariness arguments, and the argument from vagueness.9 Instead of addressing 
all of these problems in a single paper (which would be impossible), I will simply 
state the answer to the SCQ and defend it from van Inwagen’s objections. This 
will, however, take many important steps in the direction of a complete 
justification: we will see that the proposed answer entails the transitivity of 
parthood, that it is non-circular, that it provides an appropriate grounding for facts 
of composition, and that it illuminates several general issues, including the 
ancient puzzle about the Ship of Theseus. Furthermore, even in the absence of a 
complete justification, the proposed answer will make it plausible that the 
prospects for a commonsense, series-style answer are brighter than many have 
held. 
 
2. A Series-Style Answer 
 
The answer depends on four theses about events.  I will set these out in just 
enough detail to state the answer. I will then return to several of these claims for 
further justification and defense. 
The first thesis is that events are often constituted of the activities of 
certain objects (cf. van Inwagen (1990: 82–83)). For example, the event which is 
your life is constituted of the activities of the simples that make you up.10 (It is 
also constituted of the activities of your cells.) And the event associated with a 
party is constituted of the activities of the revelers, perhaps along with the 
activities of the simples which make up the venue, the food, and so on. The 
atmospheric event associated with a given tornado or hurricane will typically be 
constituted of the activities of lots of pieces of debris, water droplets, and so on.  
The event associated with a parade is constituted by the activities of the people 
and objects who participate in the parade. I will assume that this notion is clear 
enough from these examples for now, although an explicit, non-mereological 
definition of the notion appears below. 
The second thesis about events that I will rely on is that, in some cases, the 
existence of a composite object is grounded in the occurrence of an underlying 
event.11 For example, the existence of a given organism is grounded in the 
occurrence of its life, and the existence of a tornado is grounded in the underlying 
atmospheric event. The organism is not identical to the underlying event: if an 
organism lives for 100 years, the very same organism might have lived for a far 
shorter time (say one year). In that case, the 100-year event which is actually the 
organism’s life would not have been its life (this point is due to Plantinga (2006: 
9–10)). But, if the event which actually underlies the organism is 100 years long, 
then the 100 year existence of that organism is grounded in the 100 year 
occurrence of that event. (Similar remarks apply to tornados and hurricanes, 
                                                          
9  The literature on these problems is vast. For an excellent overview of the problems and the 
various approaches to solving them, see Korman (2010, 2014). For my response to the 
argument from vagueness, see my (2011). 
10  I mean ‘life’ in the narrow biological sense, which is worked out at some length by van 
Inwagen (1990: §9). 





which I take to be non-events which are grounded in underlying atmospheric 
events for exactly this reason.) 
The third thesis about events I will need is that, when an object’s existence 
is grounded in the occurrence of a given event, the event that underlies the object 
often imposes a kind of unity on the objects whose activities constitute the event. 
In these cases, the objects whose activities constitute the event are parts of the 
object whose existence is grounded in the occurrence of that event.12 For 
example, my existence is grounded in the occurrence of my life, which is 
constituted of the activities of certain simples. This event imposes a kind of unity 
on those simples, which makes it natural to say that the simples are parts of me. 
Not every event seems to impose an object-generating sort of unity on its 
participants. For example, consider a conversation. Although our activities may 
constitute a conversation, it is implausible that there is an object which arises 
from this event, and which has you and me as parts. Our involvement in the 
conversation does not require us to be unified in a way that would make each of 
us parts of a larger whole. Events that give rise to objects composed of their 
participants are events that (as I will say) impose sufficient unity on their 
participants. I will propose a (non-mereological) definition of this notion below. 
For now, it is enough to point out that we are fairly good at distinguishing events 
that impose sufficient unity, such as my life, from events that do not impose 
sufficient unity, such as a conversation. 
My fourth thesis about events is this: for some composite objects, there is 
no underlying event at all. For example, in the case of an object like a rock, there 
does not seem to be an underlying event which unifies its parts. Objects such as 
rocks aren’t event-based, but are instead lump-like. I will say more about this 
notion of lump-likeness below (I will provide both a definition and an argument 
that, on any of a number of well-known theories of events, there must be lump-
like objects in my sense). Here I just want to point out that there is an intuitive 
distinction between the objects which are event-based and those which are lump-
like. 
With these theses in place, the proposed series-style answer to the SCQ 
can be stated as follows: 
 
Necessarily, for all xs, there is a y such that the xs compose y iff either 
(i) the xs are lump-like and the xs are bonded, or  
(ii) the activities of the xs constitute an event that imposes 
sufficient unity on the xs.13 
 
Some examples will illustrate how the answer works. A model airplane is 
composed of several pieces of balsa wood which are glued together. This is 
                                                          
12  This may not be the only way in which the existence of an object can be grounded in the 
occurrence of an event. 
13  For this answer to have the official form of a series-style answer, (ii) would have to read: the 
xs are self-identical and their activities constitute an event that imposes sufficient unity on 
them. Also, to secure the reflexivity of parthood, we would have to add: ‘or (iii) there is 
exactly one of the xs.’ 
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because the pieces of wood (and the various clumps of glue) are lump-like and 
bonded together, and so compose an object by condition (i). But two people glued 
at the hand do not compose anything. For people are not lump-like—they are 
event-based objects, as discussed above—and so do not meet condition (i). And 
merely gluing together the hands of two people does not result in an event which 
imposes sufficient unity on them. So they do not meet condition (ii) either. In a 
hurricane, on the other hand, there are water droplets, quantities of air, debris, and 
so on, whose activities constitute the relevant atmospheric event. The event in 
question imposes sufficient unity on these objects. Thus, by condition (ii), these 
objects compose the hurricane. 
 
3. Six Objections 
 
Van Inwagen presses about six objections (depending on how one counts) to 
answers of the sort I have proposed. I shall respond to each one in turn. 
 
3.1 The No Proposals Objection 
 
According to this objection, nobody has ever proposed a reasonable-sounding 
series-style answer that accommodates common sense, and any such answer is 
sure to be ‘disgracefully messy’ in the sense that it would be ‘so complex that 
only God could know it’ (1990: 66–8). The articulation of my answer, which is 
humanly accessible and not in any sense ‘disgracefully messy’, rebuts this 
objection. 
 
3.2 The Transitivity Objection 
 
One of van Inwagen’s two main objections concerns the transitivity of parthood (a 
“nonnegotiable feature of parthood”). The worry is that, if we give a series-style 
answer to the SCQ, then if x is among some xs that compose y in virtue of 
satisfying one disjunct of the definition, and y is among some ys that compose z 
in virtue of satisfying another disjunct of the definition, then x will be a part of y, 
and y will be a part of z, but x will not be a part of z. 
Van Inwagen’s worry makes sense if the different disjuncts specify 
different but unrelated kinds of bond. For example, suppose we said that Gs can 
only compose something by being glued together, while Ws can only compose 
something by being welded together. Then suppose that we glue together some Gs 
to make a W, and we glue together some other Gs to make another W. Then 
suppose that we weld the two Ws together to make an object O. In this case, the 
Gs will be parts of the Ws, and the Ws will be parts of O, but, because the Gs are 
not all glued to each other—some only being connected to others by way of the 
weld connecting the two Ws—it follows that the Gs will not be parts of O, in 
violation of transitivity. 
Fortunately, the relations that feature in my proposal are more closely 




to the SCQ, there are two ways in which one might try to construct a 
counterexample to transitivity:  
 
First way: one might try to describe a case in which some objects, the xs, 
compose something in virtue of the fact that the activities of the xs 
constitute a unity-imposing event, but some part of one of the xs is not 
among some objects whose activities constitute that event. 
 
Second way: one might try to describe a case in which some objects, the 
xs, compose an object in virtue of the fact that the xs are lump-like and 
bonded, but some part of one of the xs is not among some things that 
compose the relevant object. 
 
I will argue that neither sort of counterexample is possible, and that my answer to 
the SCQ therefore entails transitivity. 
Consider the first way. Such counterexamples are intuitively impossible: 
something can’t be “caught up” in an event without its parts being “caught up” in 
the event as well. More exactly: 
 
(T)  If the activities of the xs constitute e, and y is part of one of the xs, 
then there are some zs such that the activities of the zs constitute e 
and y is among the zs. 
 
For example, if the activities of my cells constitute my life, and some simple is a 
part of one of those cells, then that simple is among some things (the simples that 
compose me) whose activities constitute my life. 
(T) is plausible in its own right. However, there is also an argument for (T) 
that proceeds from a definition of event constitution, together with two plausible 
premises. Here is the definition of event constitution: 
 
(C)  The activities of the xs constitute event e iffdf the fact that e occurs 
is grounded in facts about the activities of the xs.14 
 
Thus, when an event is constituted of the activities of some things, its occurrence 
is grounded in facts about those things. Now suppose that some event e is 
constituted of composite objects x1, …, xn. Then, by (C), the occurrence of e is 
grounded in facts about x1, …, xn. Now for the first premise: the facts about a 
composite object are grounded in facts about its parts.15 Given this premise, it 
                                                          
14  It can perhaps be left open exactly what counts as an activity in the relevant sense. 
Principally, I have in mind facts about spatiotemporal locations over time. 
15  This includes facts about the extrinsic properties of the composite, which are grounded in 
facts about the extrinsic properties of its parts. The premise is an analogue (for grounding) of 
mereological supervenience. Proponents of the latter thesis include Kim (1984), Horgan 
(1982), Zimmerman (1997), Markosian (2005), and Koslicki (2008). Strictly speaking, a 
weaker premise suffices for my argument: if some facts about the activities of a composite 
object x partially ground the occurrence of event e, then these facts about x are grounded in 
facts about the parts of x. Even Schaffer (2010), who would reject the stronger premise, could 
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follows that the facts about x1, …, xn which ground the occurrence of e are 
themselves grounded in the parts of x1, …, xn. Now the second premise: 
grounding is transitive.16 Given this premise, since the occurrence of e is 
grounded in facts about x1, …, xn, and those facts are in turn grounded in facts 
about the parts of x1, …, xn, it follows that the occurrence of e is grounded in facts 
about the parts of x1, …, xn. By (C), it follows that the parts of x1, …, xn constitute 
event e. Thus, if an event is constituted of x1, …, xn, it is constituted of the parts 
of x1, …, xn. This, in turn, is equivalent to (T).  
The second way of generating a counterexample also seems to be 
impossible. And, additionally, this can be shown by way of an argument that 
proceeds from the transitivity of bonding (which is itself guaranteed by the 
definition of bonding that appears below). For suppose that x1, …, xn are lump-
like and bonded, and that they compose object O. And suppose that y1 is among 
some objects y1, …, yn which are lump-like and bonded, and which compose x1. 
Could y1 fail to be a part of O? No. For x1 is composite and bonded to the rest of 
O. And, if a composite is bonded to something, then some part of that composite 
is bonded to that thing. So there is some part of x1—let it be y2—which is bonded 
to the rest of O. But, by hypothesis, all the parts of x1, including y2, are bonded to 
each other. Since bonding is transitive, all the parts of x1 are therefore bonded to 
x2, …, xn. By my proposed answer to the SCQ, this is sufficient for y1, …, yn (i.e., 
the parts of x1) together with x2, …, xn, to compose something. And it is 
extremely implausible to suppose that they compose anything other than O (x2, 
…, xn are, after all, parts of O, and y1, …, yn compose x1, the remaining part of 
O). Thus, y1 is a part of O. 
Given my answer to the SCQ, there are only two possible 
counterexamples to transitivity. Each kind of counterexample is impossible, both 
intuitively and in light of the above arguments. As a result, transitivity follows, 
and van Inwagen’s transitivity objection fails. 
 
3.3 The Circularity Objection 
 
This is van Inwagen’s other main objection. The idea of this objection is that the 
terms in my proposed answer—‘bonded’, ‘lump-like’, ‘the activities of the xs 
constitute event e’, and ‘sufficient unity’—are covertly mereological in nature. 
Van Inwagen seems to allow (1990: 64–5) that there could theoretically be a 
series-style answer that avoids this problem, but he claims that any such answer 
would have to invoke unity relations (relations that play the role which bonding 
and event-based unity play in my answer) which hold between some xs only if the 
xs compose something. If this were true, it would undermine the intuitive 
motivation for giving a series-style answer, namely, that relations like bonding 
can bring about composition in some cases but not others. He thus presents his 
                                                                                                                                                              
accept this weaker premise, since his monism is explicitly restricted [ibid.: 33) to exclude 
such things as events. 
16  Proponents of this premise include Schaffer (2009), Fine (2010), Correia (2010), Whitcomb 
(2012), and Cameron [forthcoming]. For some alleged counterexamples, see Schaffer (2012). 




challenge as a dilemma: any series-style answer will either be circular or it will 
fail to serve the intuitions which motivated it in the first place. 
The unity relations that my answer invokes are intuitively capable of 
relating more or less any material objects (e.g., sharks can be glued together and 
they can also be caught up in a tornado together). I will therefore embrace the first 
horn of van Inwagen’s dilemma by giving non-mereological definitions of the 
relevant terms such that, so interpreted, my proposed answer to the SCQ remains 
consistent with common sense. Such a definition of ‘the activities of the xs 
constitute event e’ appears as principle (C) above.17 I will now provide such 
definitions for the other terms as well. 
First, I define ‘e imposes sufficient unity on the xs’ as follows: 
 
e supposes sufficient unity on the xs iffdf  
(i) the activities of the xs constitute e; 
(ii) e is self-sustaining: earlier stages of e cause later stages of e; 
(iii) e is homeodynamic: possibly, there are xs such that the 
activities of the xs constitute e at one time, but none of the xs 
participates in e at another time (at which e occurs). 
 
Additionally, I define ‘x participates in e’, as it occurs in (iii), as follows: 
 
x participates in e iffdf, for some ys, x is among the ys, and the activities of 
the ys constitute e. 
 
My life, together with the simples whose activities constitute it, meets conditions 
(i) – (iii) in the above definition of ‘sufficient unity’. Therefore, my life imposes 
sufficient unity on the simples whose activities constitute it. And here are some 
further examples of events which, together with their participants, seem to meet 
the conditions: the spread of a fire, the movement of a wave across the water, the 
atmospheric event associated with the red spot on Jupiter, and the movement of an 
avalanche down the surface of the mountain. 
However, many events are not like these. For example, no event which is 
instantaneous can meet condition (iii), since a change in participants would have 
to occur over an extended interval of time. Nor in at least many cases can very 
short events be homeodynamic. The reason is that, in such an event, replacement 
of participants cannot be gradual (since gradual replacement takes too long). But, 
in many cases at least, events intuitively cannot persist through a non-gradual 
replacement of participants. Thus, consider a typical window-breaking. Such an 
event is too short to undergo a complete change in participants in the way 
required to count as homeodynamic; a relatively quick change in all the particles 
making up the window during the break seems to involve the replacement of the 
original window with a different window, and thus seems to bring about a 
different event: the breaking of a different window. A typical window-breaking, 
then, does not meet condition (iii), and does not impose sufficient unity on its 
                                                          
17 Van Inwagen himself cannot say that ‘the activities of the xs constitute event e’ is implicitly 
circular, as his own answer to the SCQ utilizes this notion of event constitution. 
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participants. And the same sort of point can be made about collisions generally, as 
well as: explosions, births, deaths, thunder claps, milk spillings, tree fallings, and 
so on. 
Another broad category of events that seem not give rise to event-based 
objects is the category of actions of individuals. Sometimes this is true for the 
reasons given above: an action is simply too momentary to be homeodynamic 
(think here of a single clap of the hands). But it is also true that no objects emerge 
from temporally extended actions of individuals. For example, suppose Frank 
Sinatra is singing a song. The event of his singing is not a self-sustaining event: 
Sinatra himself (or events in him that are not stages of the singing event) causes 
the later stages of the song; the earlier stages do not cause the later.18 Thus, this 
singing event does not impose sufficient unity on its participants. And the same 
goes for the actions of individuals generally: actions are sustained by their agents 
rather than by their earlier stages. 
A number of natural events fail condition (ii). For example, consider the 
erosion of a given rock. Later stages of the erosion are not caused by earlier stages 
of the erosion. Rather, later stages are caused by the same natural forces external 
to the rock that caused earlier stages. Similar points can be made about the rusting 
of a piece of metal, the melting of a piece of ice, the extended appearance of a 
rainbow, the rise of the tide, and so on. 
The definition I have provided of ‘e imposes sufficient unity on the xs’ is 
not adequate to settle every controversy about whether a given event imposes 
sufficient unity. However, I think that the above discussion does show that the 
definition I provided renders the concept serviceable. 
Next, I will provide a non-mereological definition of ‘lump-like’. Above, I 
claimed that an event that grounds the existence of an object often does so by 
imposing sufficient unity on its composers. Specifically, the idea is that: 
 
(E) If the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that e occurs, and there are 
some ys such that the ys compose x and all and only the ys participate in e, 
then e imposes sufficient unity on the ys. 
 
This principle will be useful in justifying the following definition: 
 
x is lump-like iffdf x is a material object and there is no event e such that 
the fact that x exists is grounded in the fact that e occurs.  
 
I am not a lump-like object because my existence is grounded in the occurrence of 
a certain event: my life. But this rock is a lump-like object, because there is no 
such event associated with it. If the xs compose the rock, then perhaps there is an 
event of the xs being bonded. However, the occurrence of this event does not 
                                                          
18  In many cases, the later stages of an action will counterfactually depend on earlier stages. 
However, the relevant counterfactuals are what Lewis (1979: 456–8) calls ‘backtracking 
counterfactuals’. This is the sort of counterfactual dependence that holds when two events, 
neither of which causes the other, have a common cause. Lewis’s own theory disregards this 




ground the fact that the rock exists. For, by (E), if this event did ground the fact 
that the rock existed, the event would have to impose sufficient unity on the 
composers of the rock. But it does not, since the relevant event in this case is not 
homeodynamic. 
That there are lump-like objects in this sense is a commitment of a 
common view about events: that the existence of a material object is not always 
grounded in the fact that some event occurs. This is plausible in its own right, but 
it is also a commitment of most known theories of events, such as those 
developed by, for example, Davidson (1969), Kim (1976), Lewis (1986b], 
Lombard (1986), and Bennett (1988). All of these theories of events entail that 
events have participants on which they depend. Thus, assuming that chains of 
dependence must end, it follows that there are events which depend, not on 
further events, but on non-event participants (typically, material objects of one 
kind or another). 
What about ‘bonded’? Following Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997, 
chapter 3), we may define this expression in terms of the relation that they call 
dynamic equilibrium: roughly, the relation that holds between two things between 
which there is a balance of attractive and repulsive forces. Given this notion, they 
define the joining relation as the relation that holds between two material objects 
when (i) either object is such that it is physically possible to push or pull it in any 
direction by correspondingly moving the other object and (ii) this is in virtue of 
the relation of dynamic equilibrium holding between them. Given these ideas, we 
may now define bonding as follows:  
 
The xs are bonded iffdf the xs are related by the ancestral of the joining 
relation on the xs.19 
 
In light of these definitions of the key terms in the proposed answer, I think it is 
plausible that the answer is not circular in any objectionable sense. Therefore, the 
circularity objection fails. 
 
3.4 The Grounding Objection 
 
Suppose it is a fact that a given model airplane is composed of pieces of wood w1, 
…, wn. According to the proposed series-style answer, this fact is grounded in the 
fact that w1, …, wn are bonded to one another. But, if bonding some objects 
together is sufficient to ensure that they compose something in this case, why 
                                                          
19  This definition differs from that offered by Hoffman and Rosencrantz (1997: 86), who say 
that some objects are bonded (their expression is “joined and connected”) iffdf each of the 
objects (or a part thereof) is joined to every other object (or a part thereof) in such a way that 
a path can be traced from the one to the other. Their definition is unsuitable for my purpose, 
since it invokes parthood. Their definition is also unsuitable for their purposes. For it entails 
that, if a part of one organism is joined to a part of another, then the organisms are bonded. 
Hoffman and Rosencrantz claim that, if two things are bonded, then there is something they 
compose. They are thus committed to the conclusion that bonded organisms compose 




would being bonded not have the result that two persons compose something if 
they are joined at the hand? In other words, what is the difference between pieces 
of wood and organisms, such that bonding has the power to cause the former, but 
not the latter, to compose something? If we are unable to answer this question, 
doubt is cast on the distinction that the answer draws. 
 Here is my reply. Parthood is transitive. Therefore, in order to cause x and 
y to compose something, one must bring it about that all the parts of x and y stand 
in a composition-inducing relation to one another. Given the proposed answer to 
the SCQ, bonding does this in the case of pieces of wood: when two pieces of 
wood are bonded together, all the parts of each piece are bonded to all the other 
parts of both pieces. But, when two organisms are bonded, the parts of those 
organisms are not all bonded to one another. Indeed, when two organisms are 
bonded, it is false that any composition-inducing relation recognized by the 
proposed answer holds among all the parts of both organisms. So, if the proposed 
answer is true, there is a relevant difference between lump-like objects and event-
based objects. The present objection claims that the proposed answer has no way 
to identify such a difference. Thus, this objection fails. 
 
3.5 The First Inadequacy Objection 
 
Van Inwagen presses two objections to the effect that no series-style answer could 
adequately illuminate the issues about composition that lead us to an interest in 
answering the SCQ in the first place. The first of these objections is that a series-
style answer has to be designed to fit our pre-theoretic opinions about what exists 
rather than informing those opinions. In particular, the relations invoked in each 
disjunct (in my answer, the relation of being bonded and the relation of jointly 
constituting an event of the right sort) will be specifically selected to generate a 
common sense ontology. Thus, common sense opinion about what exists guides 
us to our answer rather than our answer telling us what our opinions should be 
about what exists. This is a problem, van Inwagen claims, because it “would be 
nice if we had an answer that had something to tell us about what objects there 
were” (1990: 66). 
It is true that the series-style answer I have proposed was developed 
specifically to accommodate common sense. For example, my proposal is 
specifically designed to accommodate the commonsense view that chairs and 
tables and cats exist, but that no object is composed of a cat and a table (even if 
the cat is on the table, and even if the cat is lying in a puddle of strong glue). 
However, contrary to van Inwagen, I believe that this is ontologically illuminating 
in two different ways.  
 First, because no commonsense answer to the SCQ has been forthcoming, 
some (see note 7) have held that a commonsense answer to the question is 
impossible. This might suggest that common sense is mistaken about what sorts 
of material objects exist. The fact that my answer generates a commonsense 
ontology of material objects therefore undermines this source of skepticism about 




ontology. In this sense, it does have “something to tell us” about what objects 
exist. 
Second, the proposed series-style answer to the SCQ invokes two general 
categories of material objects: the lump-like objects, on the one hand, and the 
event-based objects, on the other. I believe that this distinction reveals a deep fact 
about the nature of material objects, and (as we will see below) that this fact will 
be helpful in making progress on various puzzles about material objects. Thus, I 
think that the proposed series-style answer does have something useful and 
illuminating to tell us about what sorts of material objects exist, since it tells us 
that there are two kinds of material object: lump-like objects and event-based 
objects. The idea that all material objects fall into these categories is not, I think, a 
commitment of common sense. Rather, this is an interesting consequence of a 
theory which was designed to accommodate common sense. Thus, it serves as an 
example of how attempting to accommodate common sense can lead to a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the phenomenon at hand. 
Given that the proposed answer both helps to justify the commitments of 
common sense and also helps to understand those commitments, it seems to me 
mistaken to suggest that the proposed answer has “nothing to tell us” about what 
material objects exist. The first inadequacy objection therefore fails. 
 
3.6 The Second Inadequacy Objection 
 
This objection is that no series-style answer will have anything helpful to say 
about how to deal with the familiar puzzles about the persistence of material 
objects: the Ship of Theseus, the puzzles of personal identity, and the puzzle of 
how a material object can persist through a complete change in material parts. My 
proposed answer suggests a clear solution to this last problem: people and other 
organisms survive the complete replacement of the material parts that compose 
them because their continued existence as composite objects depends not on the 
identity of the material things that make them up, but rather on the continued 
occurrence of the homeodynamic event—their life—which imposes unity on 
those material things. Furthermore, my answer also has something to offer in the 
case of the Ship of Theseus, as I will now discuss.20 The key idea here will be the 
fact that my proposed answer depends crucially on the distinction between event-
based and lump-like objects, and these notions very plausibly have built-in 
persistence conditions. 
In the Ship of Theseus case, a ship (the Original Ship) sets out to sea. 
While at sea, all of the parts that originally composed the ship are very slowly 
replaced with new parts. At the end of this long replacement process, we have a 
ship we may call the Mended Ship. Meanwhile, the original parts are gathered 
together and reassembled into their original form (the Reassembled Ship). Which 
of the two ships at the end of the story (if either) is identical to the Original Ship? 
From the perspective of my proposed series-style answer, some of the 
uncertainty we feel about this case is a result of the fact that the case is under-
                                                          
20  The complex issues about personal identity will have to remain unaddressed here, but I will 
note that I believe the proposed answer can help in this area as well. 
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described. For example, if we suppose that the ship is a living thing (which would 
be unusual, but does seem to be possible), and we suppose that my proposed 
series-style answer is correct, the uncertainty vanishes: it becomes very natural to 
identify the Original Ship with the Mended Ship. On the other hand, if we specify 
that the ship is lump-like—say, a hollowed tree trunk formed by natural forces 
and simply found by its owner—then proponents of my series-style answer to the 
SCQ will be much more strongly inclined to think that the Original Ship is 
identical to the Reassembled Ship. This is because it is extremely plausible that, if 
you start with a hunk of wood, and you end with an exactly similar hunk of 
exactly the same wood, in exactly the same state, then the hunk with which you 
started is identical to the hunk with which you ended.21 (Of course this is just a 
sufficient condition for identity of lump-like objects. It is not necessary, as a rock 
can lose a molecule and remain the same rock.) 
But what if the ship is just an ordinary ship: not a naturally hollowed-out 
tree trunk or a strange ship-shaped living thing, but a regular ship made of wood 
planks and beams and canvas and steel? Let’s call this the puzzle of the Ordinary 
Ship of Theseus. If my proposal has been correct, the puzzle of the Ordinary Ship 
of Theseus can be solved by determining whether ordinary ships are event-based 
objects whose identities are determined by their underlying events, or whether we 
should instead regard ordinary ships as lump-like objects, whose identities might 
be ensured by the identity and arrangement of their composers. 
In order to see whether the theory I have proposed has anything helpful to 
say about the puzzle of the Ordinary Ship of Theseus, let’s assume that my theory 
is correct. (This is an appropriate assumption, given that the present objection is 
that the theory, if true, would not be illuminating about these sorts of puzzles.) To 
suggest that the Ordinary Ship of Theseus is an event-based object, one would 
need to posit an event that is closely analogous to the life of an organism—an 
event such as what van Inwagen calls the ship’s “history of maintenance” (1990: 
135ff.]. Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that there is such an event as this. 
Would such an event meet the conditions required for being an event which 
imposes sufficient unity on the parts of the ship? 
I think not: the “history of maintenance” is not a self-sustaining event. For 
it seems that the most salient causal factors that lead to the later stages of the 
event are not its earlier stages, but rather events that are entirely “outside” of the 
history itself: the intentions, thoughts, and budget of the ship owner, for example.  
I will not rest anything on this point, though, as it seems clear that a ship’s history 
of maintenance does not meet the first criterion for being an event that imposes 
sufficient unity on the parts of the ship: the activities of the parts of the ship do 
not constitute the history of maintenance.  
To see this, first note that certain activities of the shipwright—his repair of 
the mast, his replacement of that rotten board, and so on—are a part of what 
constitutes the history of maintenance for a given ship. These activities are in 
                                                          
21  I find it plausible in this case to describe the ship as lump-like, but certain colocationists may 
deny that the hollowed out tree trunk could become a ship. Such colocationists will (to me, 
implausibly) regard the hunk of wood as colocated with a ship that began to exist at around 




some way analogous to various processes in a living body, such as (for example) 
the activities of various cells involved in wound healing. But although the 
shipwright is clearly a participant in the history of maintenance in this case, the 
shipwright would not thereby be among the objects which compose the ship, as it 
is a very unusual sort of ship that has a shipwright as a part. What seems to be 
going wrong is this: while the shipwright does seem to be participating in the 
history of maintenance for the ship, this history is not what grounds the existence 
of the ship. The history of maintenance certainly plays a causal role in the 
continued existence of the ship, but it does not ground its continued existence. In 
this way, the history of maintenance for a ship is not the same as the life of an 
organism: it does not impose the same kind of unity on its participants, as it 
involves participants which are not parts of the ship.22 
For these reasons, the answer I have proposed to the SCQ suggests that, in 
the case where the Ship of Theseus is a normal ship, the Original Ship is not an 
event-based object. It may of course superficially appear to be an event-based 
object, since the history of maintenance for a ship superficially appears to be 
similar to events of the sort which underlie organisms and other event-based 
objects. To the degree that this appearance is present in the reactions of those 
puzzled by the case, my account provides an explanation of what was puzzling 
about the case in the first place. But, in any case, if my proposal is correct, it 
seems that we should identify the Original Ship with the Reassembled Ship (if we 
identify it with either of the ships that exist at the end of the story).23 
 My discussion of the Ship of Theseus has proceeded on the assumption 
that the proposed answer is correct. This is because van Inwagen’s objection was 
that, if such an answer were correct, it would cast no light on such puzzles as the 
Ship of Theseus. The foregoing discussion should make it clear that van Inwagen 




We have seen that there is no in principle difficulty with common sense answers 
of the sort that I favor. Secondarily, we have seen that, at least in the case of the 
SCQ, attempting to accommodate common sense can be a fruitful and 
illuminating enterprise. The proposed answer still faces various puzzles and 
                                                          
22  This shows that, if there is such a thing as the history of maintenance for a given ship, this 
event does not impose sufficient unity on the parts of the ship. But does the history of 
maintenance impose sufficient unity on a wider class of objects that includes the ship, the 
shipwright, his tools, and perhaps other things? If there is such an event, we should be 
skeptical that it is self-sustaining for the reasons mentioned before. In addition, proponents of 
a common sense view of material objects will naturally also wish for a common sense view of 
events. Plausibly, such a view of events should not admit events that are constituted partly of 
the activities of the ship and partly of the activities of the shipwright’s hammer. To insist on 
the existence of such an event in this context, then, seems to beg the question against 
commonsense accounts. 
23  Related sorites puzzles still remain, such as the question whether there is an exact moment at 
which the Original Ship is replaced with the Mended Ship. However, sorites puzzles are 
puzzling to everyone, and do not seem to be specifically about composition. 
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arguments (mentioned in the introduction) which I have not discussed. 
Additionally, there are some composite material objects which are recognized by 
common sense, but which are not accommodated by the proposal. For example: 
piles of sand, arrangements of furniture, constellations, and so on. These problems 
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